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Systems engineering is a critical aspect of defense acquisition
management. As the “principal technical discipline that
guides the development and production of systems,” systems
engineering, if performed early in the acquisition lifecycle,
can be effective in ensuring the acquisition program meets the
cost, schedule, and performance objectives [Rendon and
Snider, 2008: 46–47]. The Department of Defense acquisition
policy states that “all programs…shall apply a robust SE
approach that balances total system performance and total
ownership costs within the family-of-systems, systems-of-
systems context” [USD(AT&L), 2004: 1]. The acquisition of
systems-of-systems increases the complexity of systems en-
gineering, and “the need to coordinate inter-program activi-
ties and manage agreements among multiple program man-
agers” [U.S. DoD, 2008: 7].
No universal agreement on a definition of the term “system
of systems” exists, but many definitions have common basic
elements. Sage and Cuppan [2001] describe a system of
systems (SoS) as having operational and managerial inde-
pendence of the individual systems as well as emergent be-
havior. Maier and Rechtin [2002] describe a system of
systems as a system with emergent behavior consisting of
systems that are operationally independent, managerially in-
dependent, evolutionarily developed, and geographically dis-
tributed. Boardman and Sauser [2006] describe one of the
differentiating characteristics of an SoS as autonomy exer-
cised by the component systems in order to fulfill the purpose
of the SoS. Two characteristics of the SoS types normally
considered in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acqui-
sition are that the component systems of an SoS are not chosen
but rather mandated to belong to the SoS and that the SoSs












systems, existing systems, or some combinations of new and
existing systems [USD(AT&L), 2006].
SoS acquisition in the U.S. DoD is faced with many
challenges. Some SoS programs have faced technical and
management challenges, if not failures. The U.S. Army’s
Future Combat System program [U.S. Army, 2002] had a
serious budget overrun [GAO, 2002, 2007]. The U.S. Coast
Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System suffered from the lack
of collaboration between contractors and the system integra-
tors’ inability to impose decisions on them [U.S. GAO,
2006b].
The acquisition challenges faced by the U.S. DoD are
similar to the challenges faced by France, United Kingdom,
and Germany. These countries “have a similar ambition to
acquire products that have not yet been developed and pro-
duced to give superiority to the armed forces…to make pro-
vision for its definition, development and manufacture to be
sure to procure the weapons for the next war and not the last
one” [Kausal et al., 1999: 5-3]. Indeed, even within these
countries there is concern that acquisition programs may fail
to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives, or that the
programs have not been optimally managed [Kausal et al.,
1999]. In addition, defense acquisition management in Aus-
tralia, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore also includes the
use of an acquisition life cycle, consisting of phases, review
milestones, and decision points, similar to the U.S. In these
countries, the military depends on industry “to develop and
produce the equipment, the essential training, maintenance,
spare parts and other equipment necessary to field an operat-
ing weapon system” [Kausal and Markowski, 2000: 6-7]. The
SoS acquisition management issues and findings suggested in
this paper would also be applicable to these countries’ minis-
tries of defense.
With an aim to develop approaches that can prevent SoS
acquisition programs from failing, Ghose and DeLaurentis
[2008, p. 172] look into “types of acquisition management,
policy insights, and approaches that can increase the success
of an acquisition in the SoS setting.” They investigate the
impact of SoS attributes, such as “requirement interdepen-
dency, project risk, and span-of-control of SoS managers and
engineers—on the completion time of SoS projects.” Ghose
and DeLaurentis [2008, p. 188; 2009, pp. 36–51] cite “the
common causes of failure within SoS acquisition processes
as: a) misalignment of objectives among the systems, b)
limited span of control of the SoS engineer on the component
systems of the SoS, c) evolution of the SoS, d) inflexibility of
the component system designs, e) emergent behavior reveal-
ing hidden dependencies within systems, f) perceived com-
plexity of systems and g) the challenges in system
representation.” In their work, they analyze the effects of
requirements interdependency, span-of-control and risk pro-
files, as a success metric, on the total time to complete the
project. For example, they find that the acquisition process
completes in 19 time-steps with low span-of-control, as com-
pared to 12 time-steps with high span-of-control. The concept
of span-of-control of engineers and managers is also ad-
dressed in the work in this paper, as it is related to both the
preacquisition and acquisition phases of SoS acquisition.
Osmundson, Langford, and Huynh [2007] address SoS
acquisition issues and their resolution by modeling and simu-
lation, but with a focus on SoS systems engineering. These
issues include (1) initial agreement to operate as an SoS, (2)
SoS control, (3) organization of the SoS, (4) identifying SoS
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measuring effective-
ness, (5) staffing, team building, and training for SoS opera-
tion, (6) identifying data requirements, (7) identifying and
managing interfaces, (8) risk management, and (9) SoS test-
ing and managing emergent behavior. Each of these issues is
briefly discussed here. A detailed elaboration of these issues
and their resolution by modeling and simulation can be found
in Osmundson, Langford, and Huynh [2007].
The work captured in this paper attempts to answer this
question: Can new contracting concepts be developed to aid
in maximizing the probability of SoS acquisition success?
The usual systems acquisition success criteria apply: perform-
ance, schedule, and budget—systems to be developed within
a desired schedule and within a budget and to perform accord-
ing to requirements. Briefly, contracting refers to the U.S.
federal government and DoD contract management policy
and guidance, roles, and responsibilities in DoD contract
management. A detailed elaboration of these contracting ele-
ments can be found in Rendon and Snider [2008].
This paper treats a realistic scenario of an SoS acquisition
program represented in Figures 1 and 2. It is realistic in the
sense that it reflects some current DoD SoS acquisition pro-
grams. Figure 1 shows three separate, autonomous, individual
systems (System A, System B, and System C). These systems
are currently being acquired (researched, developed, tested,
produced, and deployed). Each system is managed by a gov-
ernment program office and a contractor performing in ac-
cordance with the requirements of an acquisition contract. In
this scenario, during the course of the acquisition of each
individual system, a new mission arises and requires an SoS
that consists of the three systems being built; the government
thus adds a requirement that each individual system become
part of the SoS acquisition program. Examples are the U.S.
Coast Guard’s Deep Water System and the Joint Tactical
Radio System (JTRS) discussed in Section 3. Deep Water
included legacy systems and systems under development that
were to seamlessly interoperate as an SoS. JTRS is a new
software radio system under development that is intended to
interoperate with a host of legacy systems. Figure 2 reflects
the new SoS acquisition program. The shaded areas depict the
SoS requirements that are imposed on the systems being
developed. In this paper, the discussion of the contracting












structures and processes for SoS acquisition pertains to this
scenario.
The transition from the acquisition of individual systems
to the acquisition of an SoS has implications on the relation-
ship between the government and the contractors. This rela-
tionship is also determined by the organizational structure
used to manage the SoS acquisition program. Will the re-
quired SoS systems engineering be performed by a new,
overarching group, by collaboration among the systems engi-
neering organizations associated with the existing systems, or
by a single systems engineering organization associated with
one of the component systems? In addition to contracting,
organizational structure is also discussed in this paper. 
The goals of this paper are:
1. To emphasize the span-of-control of engineers on SoS
acquisition during the SoS preacquisition and acquisi-
tion phases
2. To examine all possible contracting options in conjunc-
tion with all possible organizing options
3. To arrive at the possible combinations of contracting
and organizing options for resolving the SoS acquisi-
tion issues
4. To map resolution of the SoS acquisition issues to the
SoS acquisition success criteria.
The remainder of the paper begins with a literature review
on contract structure and organizational design used in acqui-
sition organizations, followed by a discussion of the SoS
acquisition issues and an examination of some SoS-acquisi-








Academic research in contract management is founded on
several economic and management theories; the most often
referred to is agency theory [Williamson, 1987; Eisenhardt,
1989; Mayer and Khademian, 1996; Williamson, 1996;
Michaels, 2010; Yukins, 2010]. A contract between the gov-
ernment and a contractor can be analyzed as a principal-agent
relationship. The principal (government) contracts with the
agent (contractor) to perform a task, such as developing a
weapon system. The principal-agent problem occurs because
of conflicting goals and objectives between the two parties.
In this relationship, the government’s objectives include ob-
taining the product or service at the right quality, right quan-
tity, right source, right time, and right price [Lee and Dobler,
1971]. The U.S. federal government also has the additional
objective of ensuring the product or service is procured in
accordance with public policy and statutory requirements
[FAR, 2011]. Contractors, on the other hand, pursue the
objectives of earning profit, insuring company growth, main-
taining or increasing market share, and improving cash flow,
just to name a few. Because of the different and conflicting
objectives between the principal and agent, each party is
motivated and incentivized to behave in a manner consistent
with its objectives. Agency theory is concerned with the
conflicting goals between the principal and the agent in
achieving their respective objectives and is focused on mecha-
nisms related to obtaining information (for example, about the
marketplace, the supply or service, or the contractor), select-
ing the agent (to counter the problem of adverse selection),
and monitoring the agent’s performance (to counter the ef-
fects of moral hazard) [Eisenhardt, 1989]. Thus, the contract
management process (how contracts are planned, structured,
awarded, and administered) has its basis in agency theory
[Rendon, 2010].
The contracting process also has a direct impact on SoS
acquisition management and resulting outcomes, such as cost,
schedule, and performance. The contract management proc-
ess is usually discussed at the preaward and postaward level
of analysis. However, to provide additional granularity and a
deeper level of analysis as it applies to SoS acquisition, it is
more appropriate to discuss the contracting process using a
six-phased lifecycle. These six phases of contract manage-
ment are Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solici-
tation, Source Selection, Contract Administration, and
Contract Closeout [Rendon and Snider, 2008]. Each of these
contract management lifecycle phases involves specific con-
tracting activities that support SoS acquisition management
[U.S. DoD, 2006]. Given the SoS context of this paper, these
contract management activities would be performed by any
one of the individual system program offices.
Procurement Planning involves the process of identifying
which business needs can be best met by procuring products
or services outside the organization. This process involves
determining whether to procure, how to procure, what to
procure, how much to procure, and when to procure [Rendon
and Snider, 2008]. This phase of the contracting process
includes conducting outsource analysis, determining and de-
fining the requirement, conducting market research, develop-
ing preliminary documents such as Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) and Statement of Work (SOW), developing
preliminary budgets and cost estimates, and preliminary con-
sideration of contract type and consideration of any special
contract terms and conditions. In an SoS acquisition context,
the procurement planning activities for each individual sys-
tem program may need to be performed in coordination with
the other component acquisition programs within the SoS
program.
Solicitation Planning involves the process of preparing the
documents needed to support the solicitation. This process
involves documenting program requirements and identifying























































potential sources [Rendon and Snider, 2008]. This process
includes determining procurement method, determining con-
tract type, developing the solicitation document, determining
proposal evaluation criteria and contract-award strategy, and
structuring contract terms and conditions. The solicitation
planning activities of the component system programs in the
SoS acquisition program may need to be aligned with each
other to ensure success of the acquisition program.
Once the Request for Proposal (RFP) is completed, the
Solicitation phase is the process of issuing or deploying the
solicitation document and obtaining proposals from the offer-
ors [Rendon and Snider, 2008]. This process includes adver-
tising of the procurement opportunity, or providing notice to
interested offerors, and conducting a preproposal conference,
if required. Many government agencies have established Web-
based systems for centralizing and providing the maximum
visibility for the advertisement of procurement opportunities
to industry. This ensures a level of integrity, accountability,
and transparency in the contracting process.
Source Selection is the process of receiving proposals and
applying the proposal evaluation criteria to select a contractor
[Rendon and Snider, 2008]. The source selection process
includes the evaluation of proposals and contract negotiations
between the buyer and the offeror in attempting to come to
agreement on all aspects of the contract—including cost,
schedule, performance, terms and conditions, and anything
else related to the contracted effort. This process includes
applying evaluation criteria to management, cost, and techni-
cal proposals, negotiating with offerors and executing the
contract award strategy. Since the component system program
requirement may have a significant impact on the SoS acqui-
sition program, it will be essential for the other component
program offices to be involved in the source selection process,
especially the evaluation of offeror cost, schedule, and tech-
nical proposals, as well as offeror past performance evalu-
ation.
Once the contract is awarded, the contract administration
phase begins. Contract administration is the process of ensur-
ing that each party’s performance meets the contractual re-
quirements [Rendon and Snider, 2008]. The activities
involved in contract administration will depend on the con-
tract statement of work, contract type, and contract perform-
ance period. The contract administration process typically
includes: monitoring the contractor’s work results, measuring
contractor’s performance, and managing the contract change-
control process [Garrett and Rendon, 2010]. In SoS acquisi-
tion programs, the contract administration phase is critical for
successful acquisition management. It is this phase in which
the contractor is performing the contract requirements, and
the completed work is then measured and evaluated by the
government organization. In the SoS context, given the high
risk and complexities of SoS acquisition programs, it will be
essential for the other component program offices to be in-
volved in the contract administration process, especially the
monitoring, controlling, and measuring of the contractor’s
performance, as well as the coordination, review, and approval
of contract changes.
The final phase of the contracting process is the contract
closeout/termination phase. Contract closeout is the process
of verifying that all administrative matters are concluded on
a contract that is otherwise physically complete [Rendon and
Snider, 2008]. The closeout of contracts that are physically
complete requires the verification of documentation that re-
flects the completion of all required contractual actions. A
contract is considered to be physically completed when the
contractor has completed the required deliveries and the gov-
ernment has inspected and accepted the supplies; the contrac-
tor has performed all services, and the government has
accepted the services; and all option provisions have expired.
The contract closeout process includes final inspection and
acceptance of products or services, final contractor payments,
and documentation of contractor’s final past-performance
report. In the SoS context, specific activities such as final
inspection and acceptance of deliverables should be coordi-
nated with the other component acquisition programs within
the SoS. The contract management process is an important
aspect of a system acquisition program. The effectiveness of
the contracting process determines the success of an acquisi-
tion program [Rendon, 2008, 2010]. Additionally, SoS acqui-
sition programs entail a higher level of complexity and risk,
which necessitates the need for effective contract structures
and organizational designs, which will be discussed next.
A review of the literature on contract structure reveals
many research studies which are beyond the scope of this
paper. However, the following research streams seem to
emerge from these research studies. These streams include
finding the optimum balance between specificity and flexibil-
ity and the optimum balance between task-focused and rela-
tionship-focused contract structures [Brown, Potoski, and Van
Slyke, 2008; Furlotti, 2007; Rahman and Kumaraswamy,
2002].
Brown , Potoski, and Van Slyke [2008] discuss contract
structure and design in terms of specificity and flexibility
related to six contract design features (inputs, activities, out-
puts, outcomes; compensation; delivery terms; decision
rights; oversight; and proprietary ownership). Specificity re-
lates to the level of detail in the contract in terms of the
exchange. Flexibility relates to how adaptable the contract is
to changing circumstances, such as new information that
occurs during the contract period. Based on their research,
contracts for simple products are more specific, whereas
contracts for complex products are more flexible.
Furlotti [2007] reviews recent empirical literature on con-
tract design and develops a framework for identifying con-
tracting processes and dimensions, including contract
duration, complexity, contingency planning, ambiguity, and
specificity. This framework can be further used to guide the
design of relational contracts.
Rahman and Kumaraswamy [2002] use transaction cost
economics and relational contracting theory to facilitate joint
risk management in contracts dealing with uncertainty and
complexity. Using Hong Kong-based survey data and a case
study in China, they propose a conceptual model for improv-
ing project delivery through joint risk management.
Trent [2004] discusses three research streams from the
literature on organizational design. These streams include the
relationship between strategy and structure, different types of
organizational design, and factors influencing organization
design. Galunic and Eisenhardt’s [1994] research relates or-












how organizational structures and related processes must
adapt to changes in organizations’ competitive strategy and
environment. This is also supported by Chandler’s [1962]
research on contingency theory and his statement that struc-
ture follows strategy.
Dobler and Burt [1996] discuss the two major types of
organizational design (centralization and decentralization)
and their advantages and disadvantages. Advantages of cen-
tralization include greater buyer specialization, consolidation
of requirements, easier coordination and control, and effective
planning and research. Advantages of decentralization in-
clude easier coordination with operating departments, speed
of operations, effective use of local sources, and plant auton-
omy. A third type of organizational design is the hybrid model,
in which procurement functions are shared between a central-
ized procurement department and decentralized business
units [Trautmann, Bals, and Hartmann, 2009].
Johnson, Leenders, and Fearon’s [1998] research on the
influence of organizational factors on purchasing activities
indicates that organizational structure is a good predictor of
purchasing involvement in major corporate activities. Fur-
thermore, organizations with centralized purchasing struc-
tures report consistently higher involvement in major
corporate activities and greater use of selected purchasing
techniques as compared to those organizations with decentral-
ized structures.
The reviewed procurement literature reflects the investiga-
tion of contract structure in the areas of finding the optimum
balance between specificity and flexibility, and between task
focus and relationship focus. The review of the literature also
includes the investigation of procurement organizational
structure in the areas of strategy and structure, different types
of organizational design, and factors influencing organization
design. However, the review did not identify any research
related to contract structure and organizational design in the
context of SoS acquisition. The research captured in this paper





Systems acquisition refers to the disciplined management
approach for the acquisition of an individual system, such as
a weapon system (aircraft, ship, missile, etc.) or an informa-
tion technology system. The acquisition process involves the
various activities related to the design, development, integra-
tion, testing, production, deployment, operations and support,
and disposal of the system. Within the U.S. government,
specifically the DoD, systems acquisition uses a program
management approach to the management of these activities.
This approach involves the use of a project lifecycle, which
includes phases, gates, and decision points, a project manager,
and a project team [Rendon and Snider, 2008].
This approach is envisioned to apply to SoS acquisition,
but making use of some new concepts, discussed in this paper,
as there is a significant difference between acquisition of
individual systems and of systems of systems and this differ-
ence affects the nature of Government contracting for the
development of systems of systems. Such application requires
understanding of the issues associated with SoS acquisition.
The aforementioned SoS acquisition issues raised in Os-
mundson, Langford, and Huynh [2007] are now briefly dis-
cussed. This paper emphasizes the importance of systems
engineering (SE) endeavor (the span of control of the engi-
neers) tied to the SoS preacquisition and acquisition phases
and to the contracting process is emphasized.
• Initial agreement refers to decision makers initially
getting agreement that an SoS meets some desirable
objectives. It is an issue in particular when the SoS
involves systems from different organizations or mili-
tary services because establishing an initial agreement
is contingent on quantifying the benefits and risks of
the new SoS.
• SoS control must be established: Who will control the
SoS and how it will be controlled? Each partner may
lose some measure of control over its own systems in
order to enable overall SoS control.
• Organizing is a key issue of how to organize for the
development and operation of an SoS. An example is
the systems engineering process: How are processes
that interface with SoS development processes estab-
lished and monitored?
• Staffing, team building, and training refer to how an
SoS will be staffed and operated. SoS operations must
be planned for, the skills required for SoS operations
identified, and personnel with the proper skills acquired
and trained in SoS operations.
• Data requirements is an issue concerning sharing of
classified and/or proprietary design information among
the SoS partners, who must recognize and weigh a
possible loss of their system’s operational superiority
based on the shared classified or proprietary design
information against the SoS benefits.
• Interfaces must be identified and managed. Common
language, grammar, and usage must be established (for
information SoSs), configuration management invoked
to assure common agreements are followed, and re-
quired information security levels identified and provi-
sions made to assure meeting of security requirements.
• Risk management at the SoS level is an issue related to
the mitigation of SoS risks potentially affected by com-
ponent systems, which requires detailed knowledge of
component system risks and variations in individual
system outputs.
• SoS testing requires each SoS partner’s system be tested
in a manner that resolves any of its concerns about
operational behavior and SoS threads be tested.
• Measures of effectiveness is an issue because their
strong dependence on individual component system’s
measures of performance requires an understanding of
the latter, and this issue is related to the issues of data
requirements and interfaces.
• Emergent behavior, exhibited by the SoS resulting from
unknown interactions among the component systems or
from its interaction with the environment, needs to be























































ticular when an emergent behavior may be detrimental
to one or more of the partners.
Four recent acquisitions, the U.S. Army’s Future Combat
System, the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deep Water System, the Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and Homeland Security’s
SBInet, have been examined as case studies of SoS acquisi-
tions.
Future Combat System. The Future Combat System
(FCS) was originally to be composed of a networked system
of new manned ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles
The initial program cost estimate was $91.4B and the first
combat brigade equipped with FCS was expected to roll out
around 2015, followed by full production to equip up to 15
brigades by 2030 [Feickert and Lucas, 2009].
There have been significant adjustments to the FCS pro-
gram since its development started in 2003, and FCS has been
scaled back to a networked system of unmanned air and
ground vehicles and existing manned ground vehicles. The
program was restructured and four of 18 core systems were
cancelled. After the first 4 years of development, the Army
estimated a total acquisition cost growth from $91.4 billion to
$160.9 billion while independent estimates were considerably
higher—$203.3 billion and $233.9 billion. The program
started with immature technologies, and only two of the
program’s 44 technologies were fully matured by late 2006,
according to the U.S. GAO [2007], and the GAO warned that
all critical technologies may not be fully mature until the
Army’s production decision in February 2013. Requirements
for networks and software were late, poorly defined, or omit-
ted due to the accelerated schedule for FCS development
[Francis, 2008].
Deep Water. The Coast Guard’s Deepwater program con-
sisted of updating legacy assets and building new classes of
cutters, such as the National Security Cutter, the Offshore
Patrol Cutter, and the Fast Response Cutter; modernizing
aircraft and building a comprehensive, long-term aviation
force, including maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial
vehicles, and high-altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehi-
cles; developing an integrated logistics support system; and
modernizing the Coast Guard’s command, control, commu-
nications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance (C4ISR) systems to promote seamless
communications between assets. C4ISR was considered fun-
damental to improving maritime domain awareness and was
intended to be designed to not only ensure seamless interop-
erability among all Coast Guard units but also with Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) components as well as
with other federal agencies, especially the Navy.
The Deepwater program was begun in 2002, estimated to
cost $19–24 billion, and expected to take 20–25 years to
complete. The contract was awarded to Integrated Coast
Guard Systems (ICGS), which served as a lead systems inte-
grator (LSI). ICGS was a joint venture of Northrop Grumman
and Lockheed Martin, and ICGS hired subcontractors to
design and build new assets [U.S. GAO, 2006a].
As the program progressed, serious deficiencies were dis-
covered in the modernization of its existing 110-ft Island class
patrol boats, and there were also serious problems in the
C4ISR system. The Coast Guard announced in April 2007 that
it would assume the lead role as systems integrator for all
Coast Guard Deepwater assets [Brown, Potoski, and Van
Slyke, 2008]. The Coast Guard phased out its reliance on
ICGS as a LSI for Deepwater acquisition and terminated the
contract with ICGS in January 2011. To support its shift to
that of the systems integrator, the Coast Guard increased its
in house system-integration capabilities.
Joint Tactical Radio System. The Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) is a software-defined radio (SDR) that allows
a single hardware platform to be reconfigurable so that it can
accommodate multiple radio waveforms. JTRS accommo-
dates legacy and new mobile ad hoc networking waveforms
and can store and run multiple waveforms [Nathans and
Stephens, 2007]. JTRS is considered an SoS and consists of
airborne-maritime fixed site (AMF) radios, ground mobile
radios (GMR), handheld man pad small form fit radio (HMS),
network centric enterprise services (NCES), GIG bandwidth
extension (GIG-BE), and legacy networks. Lockheed-Martin
was selected to serve as the Prime Systems Contractor (PSC).
Since its initiation in 1997 until restructuring in 2006, the
JTRS program experienced cost and schedule overruns and
performance shortfalls, due primarily to immature technolo-
gies, unstable requirements, and aggressive schedules [U.S.
GAO, 2006b]. In December 2009, the JTRS held a stakehold-
ers review, after several postponements of a scheduled critical
design review. Some of the identified issues were: The current
baseline relies on airborne platform processors to perform
many of management functions, and while the platform proc-
essor will perform rudimentary radio control functions nec-
essary to meeting the platform mission, relying on the
platform processor for performing network management
functions is unacceptable; JTRS is having some difficulty
meeting NSA information assurance requirements; there have
been a large number of requirements allocated by the LSI
from upper levels to lower levels and not accepted by subcon-
tractors at the lower levels; there is concern that some wave-
forms are not ready to be ported to JTRS; the current Platform
Integration Kit (PIK) design does not integrate onto some
platforms, and some platforms do not want to use a PIK at all;
and the software design and architecture is not fully defined,
and the definition would need to include operationally rele-
vant system threads that demonstrate end-to-end capability.
The JTRS program has extended its schedule and will also
likely cost significantly more than current budget estimates.
SBInet. SBInet is a virtual fence designed to detect illegal
crossings of the U.S. southern border with Mexico. The
virtual fence consists of a network of cameras, radars, light-
ing, and other sensors—some mounted on elevated towers—
and networked through a communication system that includes
satellite nodes and links. The original contract was awarded
to Boeing Integrated Defense Systems in 2006, and it was
intended that the virtual fence would be in place, covering the
entire U.S.–Mexican border by 2011. At the time Boeing was
awarded the contract, the cost was estimated to be $2.5 billion
[Montablbano, 2010].
A GAO report on SBInet released in March 2010 identified
a flawed testing process, performance issues, and poor man-
agement as serious ongoing issues affecting the program. The
Department of Homeland Security cut off funding for the












fined and plagued by “numerous and extensive last-minute
changes to test procedures,” according to the GAO report, p.
2, and even when the system was tested, it performed poorly.
Furthermore, those overseeing the project failed to prioritize
solving problems with the system and failed to conduct fur-
ther tests. The report concluded that if the development and
testing of the system were to continue in the same fashion,
SBInet would not perform as expected and would take longer
and cost more than necessary to implement.
The project was originally scheduled for completion by
2014, but the technical glitches and delays outlined in the
GAO report held up the project so that only a prototype of the
final solution is currently in use on just one part of the border.
Each of these four case studies experienced one or more
failures in ensuring the principle of knowledge-based acqui-
sition was followed. Supporting knowledge-based acquisition
requires effective global SoS systems engineering before the
start of the acquisition process. Prior to milestone A, and prior
to the Material Solution Analysis phase that cumulates in
milestone A, an assessment must be made of technology
opportunities and resources, as well as user needs [Schwartz,
2010]. Assessment of technology opportunities and resources
requires a global understanding of the proposed SoS and its
operational environment. A technology may be considered
mature when used in an existing system, but may lack re-
quired maturity when the existing system is incorporated into
the proposed SoS and must operate under new conditions. An
information systems technology that is mature and stable
when operating within the boundaries of a single system may
lack the ability to interoperate with other systems. Technology
maturity assessment can also be considered one aspect of risk
assessment, which must be treated in the same way in which
technology maturity is assessed, namely, in the global context
of the SoS.
Testing SoSs can be considered to be similar to integration
testing of object-oriented software systems [Binder. 2000].
Systems A, B, and C are individually tested first. Then System
B that interacts with System A is integrated with System A,
and their combination is tested. Next, System C that interacts
with A is integrated with A, and their combination is tested.
Then Systems B and C which interact with each other are
integrated and tested. Finally, Systems A, B, and C are inte-
grated and tested. These integration tests are based on threads
of operations analysis, a part of the front-end systems ar-
chitecting process. Knowledge of the availability of all sys-
tems is required early in the acquisition process in order to






What contracting and organizing options can be used to aid
in resolving the SoS issues? This section discusses these
options and the correspondence between their combinations





As previously stated, government systems acquisition man-
agement involves the use of project teams. The project team
is a cross-functional team, consisting of technical specialists
from the various functional areas involved in the acquisition
process. These functional areas typically include systems
engineering, contract management, financial management,
logistics, and others. The cross-functional team is led by the
government program manager. The program manager has
overall responsibility for the success of the acquisition pro-
ject. Although the program manager has overall responsibil-
ity, the program manager may not have all of the authority
needed to manage the program. For example, the contracting
officer may have the specific authority to award and make
changes to the contract. Most systems acquisition programs
involve effort performed by a contractor with the contract
managed by the government program office. The contractor
generally has its own program manager and cross-functional
team managing the contract for the contractor. Daily commu-
nication and coordination between government and contrac-
tor program managers, system engineers, and contract
managers is the norm in defense acquisition management
[Rendon and Snider, 2008]. This paper is focused on systems






The concept of span of control on the system components is
crucial in all phases of acquisition. This means that SE disci-
pline needs to be enhanced and ever present in the SoS
preacquisition and acquisition phases. Many authors have
addressed the challenges of effectively applying systems en-
gineering to SoSs. Oxenham [2010] and Mackley, Dean, and
John [2010] identify challenges and potential solutions facing
systems engineers in defense acquisition and address systems
engineering approaches in areas that require more agile re-
sponses. As Nidfiffer [2006] said, “A key challenge is how to
obtain a better alignment of good acquisition and system
engineering principles.” Kaplan [2005] pointed out that set-
ting and coordinating mission and system requirements and
resources across spheres of influence is a challenge in SoSs.
Chen and Clothier [2003] concluded that handling SoS chal-
lenges requires managing systems engineering activities
across projects and system domains. Toward this end of
enhancing the SE discipline in the SoS preacquisition and
acquisition phases, there are two possible approaches. One is
having a capable SE organization strictly organic to the SoS
acquisition program office, and the other is using a capable
SE organization external to the SoS acquisition program
office, but the latter has strict ownership of the SE organiza-
tion during the entire SoS acquisition. The advantages of the
first approach are that the span of control of the engineers
takes hold, direct control or exchanges are facilitated, and
independence from contractors’ undue influence materializes.
The disadvantages are investment in money and people. The
second approach suffers from control and increases in budgets























































establishing contracts to have an external organization to
support.
Whereas this concept is not new, this paper calls for it to
be instituted and for the span of control to exist during the
preacquisition and acquisition phases. This call is not without
support, as demonstrated in Heng [2011], front-end SE activi-
ties in an SoS SE process enhances the success of SoS
acquisition, reflected by reduced mean activity processing
time for key activities such as implementing changes/modifi-
cations to systems, the system’s verification in satisfying SoS
requirements, integrating and synthesizing the SoS, and test-




The transition from the acquisition of individual systems to
the acquisition of an SoS has implications on the relationship
between the government and the contractors. This relation-
ship is largely determined by the contracting structure and
processes governing the SoS requirements. There are three
options for incorporating the SoS requirements into the indi-
vidual acquisition programs (Programs A, B, and C in the
scenario): Two separate contracts; replacement of the existing
contract; and modification of the existing contract. The dis-
cussion of each of them follows.
The first option is to incorporate the SoS requirements
(shaded areas of each system in Fig. 2) as a contract distinct
from the existing contract for each contractor. Contractors A,
B, and C would receive an additional contract with the specific
SoS requirements for that specific system. In this option, each
contractor would be working under two different and separate
contracts—one for the acquisition of the individual system
and one for the SoS requirements related to the individual
system.
The second option is to terminate the original contract for
the acquisition of the individual system and to negotiate and
award a new single contract for both the acquisition of the
single system and the acquisition of the SoS components of
that system. In this option, each contractor remains with only
one contract.
The third option is to negotiate a modification to the
existing contract, which incorporates the SoS requirements
for that system under the existing contract. In this option, the
contractor also remains with a single contract, albeit a modi-
fied contract, for all acquisition requirements.
This paper suggests that the third contracting option, modi-
fying the existing contract to incorporate the SoS require-
ments, would be preferred over the first option, since having
a contractor work under two separate contracts may be prob-
lematic. For example, there is a risk that the two contracts may
be in conflict with each other, such as conflicting specifica-
tions, statements of work, or schedule priorities. The re-
sources required for administering two separate contracts
would be a disadvantage. Furthermore, managing two sepa-
rate contracts would complicate organizational structures
(discussed below). The third option would be preferred over
the second option because modifying an existing contract is
more advantageous than negotiating a termination agreement
on the original contract and then negotiating a new contract
with the contractor. During these negotiations, it is likely that
the contractor would need to stop the acquisition effort, thus
impacting the project schedule and cost. The preferred con-
tracting option, modifying the existing contract to incorporate
the SoS requirements, is not without issues. First, time and
resources are still needed to add modifications to the existing
contract. Second, the preferred option is predicated on the
assumption that the set of added SoS requirements is rela-
tively smaller than that of the original system requirements.
If the added SoS requirements constituted a major portion of
the total requirements or exceeded the existing requirements,
then replacing the existing contract would be a preferred
option. Finally, care must be taken to ensure that the modified
contract will not be used as a device to correct the contractual





Different SoS acquisition contracting options bear some im-
pact on SoS acquisition program organizational structures. As
previously stated, the transition from the acquisition of com-
ponent systems to the acquisition of an SoS has implications
on the relationship between the government and the contrac-
tors, and even among the government program offices. This
relationship is also determined by the organizational structure
used to manage the SoS acquisition program.
In structuring the organization, three options can be used
for the SoS acquisition program. The first option is to desig-
nate one of the component programs as the lead program and
make that government program office responsible for manag-
ing the SoS requirements of each component system acquisi-
tion program (A, B, and C). For example, the government
program office managing System A could be designated the
lead program and made responsible for ensuring that compo-
nent systems (A, B, and C) meet the SoS requirements. Thus,
the government program manager for System A will also have
acquisition authority and responsibility over the component
system program managers for the SoS requirements for Sys-
tem B and System C. The component system program man-
agers will still maintain authority and responsibility for the
acquisition of the non-SoS portion of their respective compo-
nent system.
The second option is to establish a separate government
program office responsible for the SoS requirements of each
component system acquisition program (A, B, and C). This
separate SoS program office would have specific acquisition
responsibility and authority for the SoS requirements imbed-
ded in the three individual component systems. The compo-
nent system program managers will still maintain authority
and responsibility for the acquisition of the non-SoS portion
of their respective component system. Thus, in this option, the
SoS program manager works with each of the component
system program managers in managing the component sys-
tems’ acquisition process.
In the third option, a contractor is selected to manage the
SoS acquisition program. This contractor, typically referred
to as a Lead Systems Integrator, would be responsible for the
SoS requirements of each component system acquisition pro-
gram (A, B, and C). This option entails awarding a contract













This paper suggests the adoption of the second organizing
option, establishing a separate government program office
responsible for the SoS requirements of each component
system acquisition program (A, B, and C). The second organ-
izing option would be preferred over the first organizing
option. Having one of the component programs as the lead
program and making that government program office respon-
sible for managing the SoS requirements of all component
systems would result in potential conflicts of interest between
the lead component program manager and the other two
component program managers. The lead component program
manager may be biased and improperly influenced in the
management of the overall SoS acquisition program. In this
position, the lead component program manager may favor the
requirements of the component program over the require-
ments of the SoS program.
The second organizing option would also be preferred over
the third organizing option because having a contractor man-
age the SoS acquisition requirements may result in the con-
tractor performing some of the critical requirements
determination and acquisition decision-making of the SoS
acquisition program. The third contracting option may result
in the outsourcing of inherently government functions related
to the SoS acquisition program. It may also result in the
government’s loss of systems engineering core competency
and capability for managing SoS programs.
As discussed in Section 2, agency theory and specifically
the principal-agent relationship are often used to analyze the
buyer (government) and seller (contractor) relationship in
defense acquisition programs. However, in the SoS acquisi-
tion program scenario and organizing options discussed in
this paper, agency theory also applies to the relationship
between the SoS program office and each of the component
system program offices. The SoS program office and each of
the component system program offices will have conflicting
goals and objectives directing their acquisition management
execution. The SoS program office will be focused on the SoS
requirements and meeting the cost, schedule, and perform-
ance of those requirements, while the component system
program offices will be focused solely on their component
system requirements. Additionally, the source and scope of
authority provided to the SoS program office to direct and
oversee the component system program office acquisition
effort will also have an impact on the relationships between
the SoS and component system program offices.
Therefore, the implementation of the second organizing
option requires clearly defined charters and policies govern-
ing reporting and responsibility relationships among the SoS
and component program managers. Not only must the issue
regarding component system program managers reporting to
more than one master be resolved, but the issue regarding the
relationships among component system program managers
must also be addressed. Confusion and chaos resulting from
undefined or misunderstood relationships would impede the
management of the integration of the SoS requirements,
hence the success of the SoS acquisition as well as that of the










A logical linkage appears to exist between the preferred
contracting and organizing options for transitioning from the
acquisition of component systems to the acquisition of an
SoS. The preferred contracting option of modifying the exist-
ing contracts to incorporate the SoS requirements and the
preferred organizing option of establishing a separate govern-
ment program office responsible for the SoS requirements of
each component system acquisition program (A, B, and C)
can be effectively implemented together. The SoS program
office responsible for the acquisition of the SoS requirements
would be the requirements agency for the SoS program. In
this capacity, the SoS government program office can com-
municate the SoS requirements to each component system
program office. The component system program office would
then incorporate these SoS requirements into the component
system contract modification. The systems engineering and
contract management personnel from the SoS government
program office would communicate and collaborate with the
systems engineering and contract management personnel in
each of the component system program offices to manage
these SoS requirements.
One potential drawback to the linkage of the preferred
contracting and organizing options would be the agency the-
ory-related conflict between the SoS government program
manager and the component system government program
manager (such as between the SoS government program
manager and System A government program manager). This
would occur in situations dealing with cost, schedule, and
performance priorities between the two aspects of the system
(SoS and component). The understanding of, and adherence
to, roles and responsibilities between the SoS government
program manager and the component system program man-
ager, as well as specific contract terms and conditions, such
as an order of precedence clause in the contract, would help
deter these potential conflict situations. Given the current
defense acquisition culture of policy without practice (in
which acquisition policy is not necessarily practiced nor
enforced), it is recommended that strengthened acquisition
management governance practices, such as program manage-
ment reviews, milestone decision meetings, and contract
change boards, be implemented, thus providing additional
visibility and ensuring compliance with both SoS and com-
ponent acquisition requirements.
Table I shows a number of possible combinations of con-
tracting and organizing options, which, marked with “√”,
potentially result in the resolution of the SoS issues, which,
in turn, enables satisfaction of the SoS acquisition success
criteria (marked with “X”). As discussed above, the preferred
contracting option for the scenario of interest is the modifica-
tion of the existing contract. This contracting option can be
combined with either the separate government program office
option, which is, as discussed above, the preferred option, or
with the lead systems integrator option. For example, given
that the existing contract is modified to include the SoS
requirements, either the separate government SoS program
office option or the lead systems integrator option, the SoS



























































The purpose of this paper is to determine contracting and
organizational options to enable successful SoS acquisition
and to apply them to current and future DoD SoS acquisitions.
The following is suggested:
Sustainable systems engineering effort with an extensive span
of control by systems engineers within an SoS acquisition is
necessary for a successful SoS acquisition. Having a capable
SE organization strictly organic to the SoS acquisition pro-
gram office is recommended as opposed to using a capable
SE organization external to the SoS acquisition program
office. This implies an investment in money and people in
order to build up SE capability within the acquisition program
office. One solution is to create a core team of systems
engineers—well versed in SoS systems engineering—within
the DoD. SoS acquisition program offices would then draw
on core team members to staff a program organic SE organi-
zation. This concept is consistent with the systems engineer-
ing approach recommended in the Department of Defense
Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems [U.S.
DoD, 2008] and the concept could be tested using a pilot
program, or possibly using modeling and simulation, such as
described by Hubbard et al. [2010]. The higher levels of
complexity and risk inherent in SoS acquisition programs
necessitates an increased importance be placed on the acqui-
sition contracting processes. Procurement planning, solicita-
tion planning, source selection, and contract administration
activities of any of the component systems should be per-
formed in a coordinated and collaborative manner with the
other component acquisition program offices. Just as the
contracting process is a critical factor in the success of any
individual acquisition program, the alignment of the contract-
ing processes with each of the other component acquisition
programs will be a factor in the success of the overall SoS
acquisition program. In addition, among the possible con-
tracting options, modifying the contract is the preferred op-
tion. But that is not sufficient. Organizing options must be
considered, for an organizing option must be coupled directly
with a contracting option and, together, they would enable
resolution of the SoS acquisition issues, which, in turn, could
improve the probability of SoS acquisition success, and
thereby facilitating and effectively managing the SoS acqui-
sition effort.
A next step in enabling successful SoS acquisition is
suggested to be the development and implementation of a
Web-based collaboration system (WBCS) in a pilot SoS ac-
quisition program within DoD. As discussed in Huynh, Os-
mundson, and Rendon [2011], this WBCS will be an
instrument to enable successful collaboration and alignment
of the individual system programs within an SoS acquisition
program.
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